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We examine patterns of acquiring non-native languages in a model with two linguistic communities with 
heterogeneous learning skills, where every individual faces the choice of self-learning the foreign language or 
acquiring it at a profit-maximizing linguistic school. We consider a one-school model with divisions in both 
communities and various two-school settings with a school in each community. We compare the number of 
learners and welfare implications under self- learning with those obtained under various schooling contexts. 
In particular, we show that for communities with similar size, introducing language schools always increases 
the number of learners with respect to the exclusive self-learning option. 
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In this paper, we compare the outcomes of two diﬀerent modes of learning
languages, self-learning and learning at school, in a simple model of language
acquisition, based on previous work by Selten and Pool (1991), Church and
King (1993), Shy (2001), and Gabszewicz, Ginsburgh and Weber (2010).
In their pioneering paper Selten and Pool (1991) formulate a general
game-theoretical model of language acquisition. They introduce the notion
of communicative beneﬁts, that cover a wide range of economic, cultural and
social advantages gained by learning languages. Church and King (1993)
consider a special case of the Selten-Pool model with two linguistic commu-
nities, where every agent is initially proﬁcient only in her own language, but
can acquire the other one at a cost identical for all agents. Every agent is
faced with a binary choice: either to learn the other language, or refrain
from acquiring it. The communicative beneﬁt of an individual increases with
the number of those with whom she can communicate using a common lan-
guage. Thus, the equilibrium outcome depends on a network externality since
the strategic decision by an individual to learn the other language expands
the communication links for others who speak that language. The larger
the number of individuals in the other language group who learn the native
tongue of an agent, the smaller the beneﬁt from second language acquisition
for that agent. Church and King (1993) show that only corner solutions ex-
ist in equilibrium: either no one learns any language in either community
(if the cost of learning is suﬃciently high), or everybody learns the foreign
language in one community while nobody does in the other. The fact that
only corner equilibria exist is due to the assumption that learning costs are
homogeneous over the population: once learning is beneﬁcial for one agent
initially endowed with some language, it is also so for all those who speak
the same language.
Ginsburgh, Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın and Weber (2007) suggest that interior equilib-
ria may exist, but focus on the empirical implications of the model, namely,
the derivation of demand functions for languages. Gabszewicz, Ginsburgh
and Weber (2010) introduce a heterogeneous variant of the Church-King
model where individuals diﬀer in their degree of learning aptitude and, there-
fore, face diﬀerent individual learning costs. Agents opt to maximize their
net communicative beneﬁt deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the communica-
tive beneﬁt discussed above, and their individual cost of acquiring a new
language. Gabszewicz, Ginsburgh and Weber require that, in equilibrium,
2expectations of learners in one population about the number of learners in
the other are fulﬁlled.
In this paper we oﬀer an extensive menu of language learning mechanisms.
In addition to self-learning examined in the aforementioned papers, we also
introduce proﬁt-maximizing language schools which charge tuition fees. We
consider diﬀerent scenarios, including the one that allows the school to open a
division in each of two linguistic communities.1 This introduces a multi-sided
market interpretation of the model in which tuition fees are explicitly taken
into account when deﬁning learning costs of individuals. The multilingual
school then appears as a two-sided platform embarking individuals from both
communities. While two-sided markets2 often involve positive cross network
externalities, this is no longer the case in the bilingual context considered
here. Agents are faced with negative externalities since the beneﬁt obtained
from learning the other language “at home” decreases with the number of
agents who speak the home language in the other community.
Self-learning and learning at school are a priori very diﬀerent mecha-
nisms. The former introduces coordination among agents through the Nash
equilibrium of a game with a number of players equal to the total number of
citizens in the two communities. By contrast, the second mechanism requires
the presence of an intermediary (the platform) to coordinate the decisions
between the two sides of the market, and relies on proﬁt maximization and
prices (tuition fees). In spite of these discrepancies, we show that both mech-
anisms lead to similar features, but that welfare may become larger with the
existence of schools. For instance, under both mechanisms, an increase of
the population in the home community reduces the fraction of learners in
the home community while the reverse holds when increasing the population
in the other community. It is interesting to point out that while the raising
learning costs reduce the fraction of learners in the smaller community, it
is not necessarily the case with respect to the larger community. Moreover,
under both mechanisms, self- and school-learning, the fraction of learners
is larger in the smaller population. The presence of a negative externality
in language learning generates some results that may seem counterintuitive.
For instance it may happen that the introduction of language schools in both
communities reduces the number of learners in one of them with respect to
1An example of such a school is the well-known Berlitz School of Languages.
2The notion was introduced by Rochet and Tirole (2003), and applied to several con-
texts such as credit cards (Wright, 2004) and the media industry (Gabszewicz, Laussel
and Sonnac, 2001, Anderson and Coate, 2004).
3the exclusive self-learning setting.
Note that the model with language schools can be viewed either as a two-
sided market, or as a multiproduct monopoly. If it is considered as a market
for a good or service the utility of which on one side (in our case, in one
community) depends on the number of buyers on the other side (the other
community), then the situation we describe is a two-sided market. However
this dependence is not as signiﬁcant as, say, in the credit cards’ market.
While, in the latter, the utility of a cardholder is zero if no shop accepts it,
the utility of learning a foreign language is positive, even if nobody learns
in the other community. If a two-sided market is viewed as a market for a
good that has value only if the two sides are “on board,” then the situation
described above corresponds to a multiproduct monopoly: a language school
may be operated in each community by diﬀerent owners without qualitatively
impairing the value of language schools for agents on both sides. Note that
the conceptual problem raised above is rather a question of terminology: if
the multiproduct monopolist acts as a proﬁt maximizer taking into account
the spillovers between the two markets, he would behave as the platform
described above.
The alternative institutional arrangement with one school acting as a mo-
nopolist in each community, requires another type of implicit coordination
between the two communities. In spite of being local monopolists, the de-
mand for learning the foreign language at each local school depends not only
on its own subscription fee, but also indirectly on the subscription fee set by
the school in the other community. Indeed, when the latter sets a low fee,
it attracts more learners, increasing thereby the number of those who learn
the language of the former community. This in turn diminishes, in this com-
munity, the incentives to learn the foreign language and entails a decrease
in demand for learning. It can be argued that local schools are unaware of
this rather complicated demand interdependence, in which case they behave
as myopic monopolists who do not take into account the spillovers described
above. Alternatively, they can be sophisticated monopolists who are aware
of these spillovers, in which case the interdependence between demands be-
comes explicit and makes the payoﬀs of each local monopolist depend not
only on its own fee, but also on the fee set in the other community. We
distinguish the eﬀects of these two alternative assumptions on the fraction of
language learners, and compare them to the corresponding fractions under
self-learning and the multi-sided school operation.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2,
4which also includes the main results obtained in the case of self-learning only.
Section 3 describes the two-sided market solution and performs the compar-
ative statics and welfare analysis with self-learning only. Section 4 contains
the analysis of the setting where a local school acts as a monopolist in each
separate community, both under the assumption of myopia and sophistica-
tion. In Section 5, the various modes of language learning are analyzed in
a simplifying setting with equal populations in both communities. Section 6
concludes and suggests further research avenues. Proofs of the propositions
are relegated to an appendix.
2 The model
We consider two communities (regions, countries) e and f, whose popula-
tions sizes are E and F, respectively. All individuals are assumed to be born
unilingual and speak only their native language, e or f. However, they may
consider acquiring the other language. This decision is based on two factors,
potential beneﬁts and learning costs.
Beneﬁts. Following Church and King (1991), we assume that the gross
communicative beneﬁt of an individual is represented by the number of others
(in her own and in the other community) with whom she shares a common
language. Assume that a proportion lf of citizens in f learns language e.
A citizen in population e who refrains from learning language f can com-
municate with E fellow citizens and with the lfF individuals of the other
population who have acquired language e. That is, her communicative ben-
eﬁt is represented by E + lfF. If that individual from community e learns
language f, her communicative beneﬁt will take into account all individuals
from both populations E + F. However, to acquire the other language, she
will have to face learning costs.
Learning costs. We assume that both communities consist of heteroge-
neous individuals uniformly ranked on the basis of a parameter θ ∈ [0,1],
representing their type, which is the inverse of their ability to learn a foreign
language. Those with lower θ can acquire it with a relative ease, and, in par-
ticular, an individual with θ = 0 can learn it in her sleep. A larger θ is the
sign of more diﬃculty in learning the other language. We identify individuals
by their type θ and introduce two options of acquiring the foreign language:
5The ﬁrst is self-learning. In this case we assume that every individual
faces a personalized self-learning cost C(θ), which depends on her language
ability. For simplicity, we assume that in both communities self-learning
costs are given by C(θ) = cθ, where c is a positive parameter common to
both populations.3
The second is school-learning. Indeed, the demand for foreign language
learning creates an opening for language classes provided on a commercial
basis and we assume now that individuals in both communities are oﬀered
an additional means of learning the other language by attending proﬁt-
maximizing language schools, that charge tuition fees pe and pf to popu-
lations e and f, respectively. While attending classes, individuals who learn
still invest time and eﬀort. We assume that an individual θ in community e
(f), who enrolls in the school will face the total cost pe + rθ, (pf + rθ, re-
spectively), where r, again for reasons of analytical simplicity, is a common
parameter in both communities. The school allows reducing the personalized
cost so that the school-generated parameter r is smaller than the self-learning
cost factor c.
Assuming without loss of generality that the population size E is larger
than F, we impose the following assumption on the parameters of the model:
Assumption
F ≤ E < r < c, (1)
where the inequality E < r is a necessary and suﬃcient condition to generate
positive demands for schooling (see below). Note also that this inequality
guarantees that the school-driven learning cost r, and the self-learning cost
c of the least able individual whose θ = 1 in both populations, exceeds the
maximum additional communicative beneﬁt she can derive from learning the
other language. This assumption ensures that not all individuals in e and f
will learn the other language. It will be used in proving all the results.
Individuals in both populations have three options: to learn by them-
selves, to attend the division of the school located in their community or
refrain from learning the other language. We now derive the communicative
beneﬁt of an agent of type θ in either of the three cases:
3This assumption is introduced for the purpose of analytical simplicity only. The com-
monality of the cost parameter can be also challenged on empirical grounds, see Ginsburgh
and Weber (2010, chapter 3).
6• Self-learning. Every agent of type θ who incurs the cost c of learning the
other language on his own will be able to communicate with both populations:
E + F − cθ. (2)
• School-learning: Every agent of type θ who incurs the cost c of learning
the other language at scool will be able to communicate with both popula-
tions:
E + F − pe − rθ. (3)
• No learning: Without any investment, every agent will still be able to
communicate with the members of her own community e and those in f who
learn language e:
E + lfF. (4)
For a given tuition fee pe for learning language f in community e, denote
by θ1(pe) the individual (if she exists) who is indiﬀerent between self-learning







Note that individuals with θ < θ1(pe) prefer self-learning over learning at
school, whereas all those with θ > θ1(pe) will make the opposite choice.
Indeed, individuals with low θ face low cost of self-learning and would not
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to pay tuition. However, to estimate the demand addressed
to the language school, we have to make sure that individuals with higher
θ indeed enroll in the school and do not drop out of the language market
alltogether. For this, denote by θ2(pe,lf), the individual (if she exists) who is
indiﬀerent between learning at school and refraining from learning language




F(1 − lf) − pe
r
. (6)
Individuals with θ < θ2(pe,lf) prefer learning at school rather than forego
learning language f, whereas all those with θ > θ2(pe,lf) will refrain from
learning. We restrict our attention to levels of tuition fees pe and pf that
guarantee that the solutions are interior and that markets are not fully cov-
ered. We have the following result:
7Proposition 1 Given the tuition fee pe and the fraction lf of learners of
language e in community f, there is an incomplete market coverage
and a strictly positive apprenticeship in community e only if
0 < θ
1(pe) < θ
2(pe,lf) < 1. (7)
In this case,
(i) individuals with θ ∈ [0,θ1(pe)) engage in self-learning;
(ii) individuals with θ ∈ [θ1(pe),θ2(pe,lf)) enroll in the language school;
(iii) individuals with θ ∈ [θ2(pe,lf),1] refrain from learning.
A similar reasoning applies to community f. That is, given the tuition
fee pf and the fraction le of learners of language f in community e,
there is an incomplete market coverage and a strictly positive appren-
ticeship in community f only if
0 < θ
1(pf) < θ











(iv) individuals with θ ∈ [0,θ1(pf)) engage in self-learning;
(v) individuals with θ ∈ [θ1(pf),θ2(pf,le)) enroll in the language school;
(vi) individuals with θ ∈ [θ2(pf,le),1] refrain from learning.
Proposition 1 implies that the fraction of learners le in community e is
given by4
le =
F(1 − lf) − pe
r
. (9a)
Similarly, the fraction of learners lf in community f is:
lf =
E(1 − le) − pf
r
. (9b)
4In fact, the fraction le is determined by le = min{(F(1 − lf) − pe)/r,1}. However,
since we restrict our examination to interior solution only, we proceed with the expressions
in (9a) and (9b).
8By solving the system (9a)-(9b), we derive the fraction of learners in both
communities as functions of the tuition fees pe and pf:
le(pe,pf) =
rpe − rF + EF − pfF
EF − r2 , (10a)
lf(pe,pf) =
rpf − rE + EF − peE
EF − r2 . (10b)
Note that Proposition 1 allows us to derive the demand for apprenticeship
in both populations, as only individuals from the intermediate range of θ will
enroll in the language school (see (ii) and (v) in Proposition 1). The demands
as functions of le and lf are given by
E
 















By substitution of (10a)-(10b) in (11), we obtain the demands De(pe,pf) and
Df(pe,pf) at the two divisions, namely,
De(pe,pf) = E
 
















Since we compare the various schooling options to self-learning, it is useful
to describe here the main results obtained by Gabszewicz, Ginsburgh and
Weber (2010) for that case. We identify the marginal types θ of individuals
who are indiﬀerent between self-learning and foregoing the study of the other
language given by the cutoﬀ values θ(le) and θ(lf) in communities e and f,
respectively. Assuming self-fulﬁlling expectations, we equate (2) and (4) and
obtain the expressions for shares of learners in both communities:
θ(lf) = (1 − lf)
F
c
















EF − c2 .
9Assumption (1) implies that the diﬀerence l∗
f −l∗
e is none-negative (and posi-
tive if F < E) so that the number of learners in the large community cannot
be larger than the one in the small community. The small community gains
more from learning the other language than the large one, since its population
has access to more speakers.
3 Language learning in a two-sided market
Now turn to the case of the language school that oﬀers language learning
in both communities. In this two-sided platform setting, the school chooses
prices ˜ pe and ˜ pf which maximize total proﬁts π(pe,pf) over the two divisions:
π(pe,pf) = peDe(pe,pf) + pfDf(pe,pf),
with De(pe,pf) and Df(pe,pf) as deﬁned in (12a) and (12b). By Lemma 1 in
the Appendix, π(pe,pf) is concave and optimal prices can be obtained from
the ﬁrst-order conditions:
˜ pe =




E (c − r)(c − F)
2(c2 − EF)
. (13b)
By assumption (1), these prices are positive, and the positive demands for
schooling are given by:








Equilibrium shares of learners deﬁned in (14a) and (14b) are ﬁnally obtained
by substituting optimal prices (13a) and (13b) in (10a)-(10b):
˜ le =
F (cr2 − rEF − cEF + c2r − c2E − r2E + 2E2F)
2(c2 − EF)(r2 − EF)
(14a)
˜ lf =
E (cr2 − rEF − cEF + c2r − c2F − r2F + 2F 2E)
2(c2 − EF)(r2 − EF)
. (14b)
10By Lemma 2, these equilibrium shares ˜ le and ˜ lf lie in the interior of the
unit-interval. Observe also that, since F ≤ E, assumption (1) implies that
the diﬀerence between (14b) and (14a) is non-negative:
˜ lf − ˜ le =
(cr − EF)(c + r)(E − F)
2(c2 − EF)(r2 − EF)
≥ 0. (15)
This leads to the following proposition, that is similar to the one obtained in
the case of self-learning only.
Proposition 2 The fraction of learners under a two-sided platform cannot
be smaller in the smaller community.
We now turn to comparative statics results:
Proposition 3
(a) An increase in the home population reduces the fraction of learners




dF are both negative
(b) An increase in the population of the other population raises the
fraction of learners at home: the values of d˜ le
dF and
d˜ lf
dE are both positive
(c) If E > F, an increase in the learning cost c reduces the fraction of
learners in the smaller community F, while there is a threshold value ˆ c,
such that the fraction of learners in the larger community E increases
for c < ˆ c and declines for c > ˆ c. If E = F, an increase in the learning
costs reduces the fraction of learners in both communities.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for these results is as follows: (a) when there are more
people to communicate with at home, the incentive to learn the language
of the other community decreases; (b) an increase in the population of the
other community makes it more compelling to learn their language; (c) when
learning costs increase, there are less learners; the latter eﬀect is however
mitigated in the larger community under relatively low level of learning costs.
We now compare the shares of learners with and without schools. The
diﬀerence ˜ le − l∗
e obtains as
˜ le − l
∗
e =
(−cE + FE + cr − rE)(c − r)F
2(r2 − FE)(c2 − FE)
.
11Since the denominator is positive, the sign of ˜ le−l∗
e is determined by the sign





The sign of this expression could be negative if the population size E sub-
stantially exceeds F. However, it is always positive when E = F.
Similarly, ˜ lf − l∗





which is always satisﬁed whenever E ≥ F. Therefore,
Proposition 4
(a) In the smaller community, the number of learners is always larger
than under self-learning only.
(b) However, in the larger community, there exists a threshold value of
the self-learning cost such that the number of learners under a two-sided
platform can be smaller than under self-learning only.
(c) If the two communities have the same size, the number of learners
under a two-sided platform is always larger than under self-learning in
both communities.
To conclude this section we compare welfare impact of the entry of a
linguistic school. To do so, we compare the aggregate welfare of both com-
munities with and without the language school.
With self-learning only, the welfare of population e is determined by its
aggregate communicative beneﬁt net of the learning costs:
W
∗











The ﬁrst term represents the welfare of those (1 − l∗
e)E citizens who do not
learn language F; each of them gets a beneﬁt equal to E + l∗
eF, since they
can communicate with that number of e-speakers. The second term describes
the net beneﬁt of e-citizens who learn f; their mass is l∗
eE, and the beneﬁt
that each of them is E + F. The third term is the total cost of those who

















12The welfare of population f, W ∗
f obtains by interchanging F (and f) and E























In the schooling option, the derivations are quite similar. One has to take
into account two diﬀerent types of fees in every community and the fact that
the constant part of the schooling fees, ˜ pe and ˜ pf, does not directly enter the
calculations, since it represents the revenue for the school and the cost for
customers. The welfare in community e is therefore given by:
˜ We = E






  ˜ le+ ˜ De
˜ le
θdθ,
where ˜ De = De(˜ pe, ˜ pf) is the demand for learning in community E under
proﬁt-maximizing prices (13a) and (13b). Since ˜ We can be simpliﬁed to
˜ We = E








rE ˜ De( ˜ De + 2˜ le),
and the welfare of population f, W ∗
f obtains by interchanging F (and f) and
E (and e) in the last expression, the aggregate welfare of the two communities
is:
˜ W = E
2 + F











r[E ˜ De( ˜ De + 2˜ le) + F ˜ Df( ˜ Df + 2˜ lf)].
To simplify these expressions, we consider the case (as we will also do in
other sections) where E = F. Then we have
˜ W − W
∗ =
N2(c − r)




2 + (N − 4)N
4 − 2Nr(2 + N
2) + c(2N(2 + N
2)(N − 3)
−(16 − Nr(3 − 2N)).
It is easy to see that ∆ is positive when N is suﬃciently large (e.g, N > 4).
Thus,
13Proposition 5 There exists a threshold N∗ such that if assumption (1)
holds with E = F > N∗, the introduction of a language school generates
higher welfare than self-learning only, i.e. ˜ W > W ∗.
In that case, the introduction of language schools raises the welfare in
both community. Indeed, since their sizes are equal, this is equivalent to an
increase in joint welfare.
Obviously, by invoking a continuity argument, we may extend this result
to the case with communities with unequal but similar sizes. Namely, we
can state that there exists ε > 0 such that the Proposition 5 holds whenever
0 < E − F < ε. However, this is not necessarily true if the size inequality
between E and F is suﬃciently large. Thus, introducing language schools
does not necessarily yield improvements in terms of communicating beneﬁts.
This observation would call for a careful analysis of subsidizing learning costs,
since network eﬀects may end up reducing aggregate welfare beneﬁts.
4 Language learning with two local schools
We now consider an alternative set-up which constitutes a natural reference
point to which the two-sided market approach can be compared. We assume
that there exists a language learning school in each community, behaving in
its own community as a monopolist. As suggested in the introduction, the
demand for learning the foreign language at each local school depends on its
own subscription fee, but may depend also on the subscription fee set by the
school in the other community. Indeed, when the school in say, f sets a low
fee, it attracts more learners of e. This in turn reduces the incentives to learn
f in community e and entails a decrease in demand at a given value for lf.
Facing this situation, local monopolists can either be unaware of (or ig-
nore) these spillovers and behave in a myopic way or, on the contrary, be
sophisticated enough to take them into account when they set their own
price. We examine the two situations.
4.1 Myopic monopolists
Here, the school in community e (resp.f) computes its demand at a ﬁxed
proportion of learners in the other community, so that their demands write
as in (11), with corresponding proﬁts
14πe(pe,pf) = peE
 















Separate proﬁt maximization by each school leads to the corresponding












(c − r)(1 − le).
Substituting these prices in the corresponding demand functions, and equat-





F (1 − lf) −
1
2c






E (1 − le) −
1
2c
E (c − r)(1 − le)
 
.





(cE − 2cr + rE)(c + r)F






(cF − 2cr + rF)(c + r)E
(2crEF + c2EF + r2EF − 4c2r2)
. (16b)
It is easy to check that, as in the two previous cases, the following result
holds:
Proposition 6 The fraction of learners is larger in the smaller community.
154.2 Sophisticated monopolists
We ﬁnally consider the alternative set-up in which the local monopolists are
aware that the number of foreign citizens who know the home language indi-
rectly inﬂuences the home demand for the foreign language. This introduces
a strategic interaction between schools, to the extent that an increase in price
in the foreign community decreases the number of foreigners who are willing
to learn the home language and, accordingly, increases the home demand
for learning the foreign one. This strategic interaction can be formalized as
a game with the two schools as players, prices as strategies and payoﬀs as
proﬁts. Using the expressions (12a) and (12b), these payoﬀs write as
πe(pe,pf) = peE
 
















It is easy to see that each payoﬀ is concave in its own price. The ﬁrst-
order conditions are thus suﬃcient and necessary to obtain the equilibrium
prices ˆ pe and ˆ pf,:
ˆ pe =
F (c − r)(2cr2 − cEF − rEF − crE − r2E + 2E2F)
4c2r2 − c2EF − r2EF − 6crEF + 4E2F 2
ˆ pf =
E (c − r)(2cr2 − cEF − rEF − crF − r2F + 2EF 2)
4c2r2 − c2EF − r2EF − 6crEF + 4E2F 2 .
The equilibrium values of ˆ le and ˆ lf can be obtained by substituting the
above equilibrium values of prices in (10a) and (10b). This leads to
ˆ le =
(cFE + rFE + crE − 2cr2 − 2FE2 + r2E)(cr − 2FE + r2)F




(cFE + rFE + crF − 2cr2 − 2F 2E + r2F)(cr − 2FE + r2)E
(6crFE + c2FE + r2FE − 4c2r2 − 4F 2E2)(r2 − FE)
. (17b)
16Subtracting (17b) from (17a), we get
ˆ le − ˆ lf =
−(cEF + rEF − 2cr2)(cr − 2EF + r2)(E − F)
(4c2r2 − c2EF − r2EF − 6crEF + 4E2F 2)(EF − r2)
.
Lemma 3 of the appendix shows that the denominator of this expression is
negative. If E > F, the numerator is positive, so that
Proposition 7 The fraction of learners is larger in the community with the
smaller population.
5 Comparing numbers of language learners
Our analysis in previous sections has covered four institutional mechanisms
of language learning: self-learning only, a two-sided platform, two local
monopoly schools, either myopic or sophisticated. In Section 3, we com-
pared in full generality the shares of learners in the two ﬁrst situations – (i)
self-learning only and (ii) school as a platform. However, the analytical chal-
lenges prevent us from performing the same comparison with the two other
set-ups – (iii) myopic monopolists and (iv) sophisticated monopolists. We
therefore assume throughout this section that the communities are of equal
size and denote N = E = F. It is worth pointing out that using a continuity
argument as we did ion Section3, our results can be extended to the case of
two communities of “almost” equal sizes.
Let us now list the expressions of the equilibrium shares corresponding







N (cr2 − rN2 − cN2 + c2r − c2N − r2N + 2N3)





(cN − 2cr + rN)(c + r)N
(2crN2 + c2N2 + r2N2 − 4c2r2)
(iii)
ˆ l =
N (cr − 2N2 + r2)
(N + r)(Nr − Nc + 2cr − 2N2)
. (iv)
From direct comparisons between (i) and any of the other three cases (ii),
(iii) and (iv), we obtain
17Proposition 8 If E = F, the introduction of language learning schools
increases the fraction of learners with respect to self-learning only.
Performing similar direct comparisons between the pairs (˜ l,l
◦),(l
◦,ˆ l) and




< ˆ l. It follows
that ˜ l < l
◦
< ˆ l.
The results of these comparisons are summarized in Proposition 9:
Proposition 9 If E = F, the fractions of learners of the foreign language
corresponding to (i) self-learning only, (ii) a two-sided platform, (iii)
myopic local monopolies and (iv) sophisticated local monopolies satisfy
the following inequalities
l
∗ < ˜ l < l
◦
< ˆ l.
The two propositions show that any type of school induces more agents
to learn the language of the other community than if there is self-learning
only. If the goal of a two-community state is to have more people learning
the language of the other community, private schools always help. However,
some forms of competition are better than others. The two-division platform
` a la Berlitz, which maximizes its joint proﬁt over the two regions is the less
satisfactory, since it is the institution that is closer to a monopoly. Myopic
monopolies, one in each community, do better, because they both neglect
the interaction between their markets and, thus, discard the competitive
pressures generated by this interaction. By contrast, more competition is
introduced when the two local monopolies behave in a sophisticated way by
taking into account strategic choices in the other community.
6 Conclusion
The paper compares the outcomes of three diﬀerent language learning proce-
dures. In the ﬁrst, learners proceed by using their own speciﬁc ability to learn
the foreign language at a cost which varies within the population according
to these abilities. In the two other settings, potential learners are assisted
by language instructors. This reduces the individual learning cost, compared
with self-learning. However the subscription fee adds up to this reduced in-
dividual learning cost, which makes a priori unclear whether it is better to
learn by oneself or by using the school’s services. According to the level of
18the tuition fees, some potential learners – those with low individual learning
costs – prefer to learn by themselves, while those with higher learning costs
may prefer to go to school.
When the language school consists of two branches, one in each com-
munity, and chooses tuition fees that maximize its joint proﬁts, it can be
considered as a two-sided platform, that turns out to be a rare example of
negative cross-network externalities: the more people in a foreign community
learn my own language, the smaller my own interest to learn theirs.
We also consider a setting in which there exists a school in each commu-
nity that acts as a local monopolist who may or may not take into account
the network eﬀects of the other monopolist.
In spite of major diﬀerences between the three mechanisms, they turn
out to be similar in their eﬀects from several viewpoints. In fact, under all
mechanisms, the fraction of learners is larger in the community with the
smaller population. Furthermore, according to Propositions 1 and 3, both
under self-learning and the two-sided platform, an increase in the “home”
population reduces the fraction of learners in the home community, while an
increase in the population of the “foreign” community raises the fraction of
learners in the home one. We also compare the total fraction of learners in
each community with and without schooling, and in the case of the equal-
size communities we oﬀer a complete ranking of the number of learners in all
institutional settings as a function of the model parameters. We also point
to some welfare implications in the case of the platform.
It is diﬃcult to judge whether our conclusions are robust since they are
obtained under a set of rather restrictive conditions, such as the linearity of
the beneﬁt function and Assumption (1), introduced to guarantee the ex-
istence of an interior solution. In spite of the diﬃculties inherent to this
problem, our approach nevertheless oﬀers some insights into language learn-
ing mechanisms.
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8 Appendix
Lemma 1 The function π(pe,pf) is concave.




































where D1 and D2 are the relevant determinants extracted from the
Hessian matrix. Since, under (1), EF > cr and EF > r2, D1 is
obviously non-positive. After some simple algebraic transformations,











an expression that is strictly positive. Thus, the proﬁt function is
concave. QED.
Lemma 2 The values of the equilibrium shares of learners in both commu-
nities, ˜ le and ˜ l, lie strictly between 0 and 1.
Proof: Consider community e. Since the denominator in (14a) is positive,
the sign of ˜ le is the sign of the numerator which is itself a second order
polynomial P(r) = A + Br + Cr2, where, by (1), A = 2E2F − c2E −
cEF < 0, B = c2−EF > 0, and C = c−E > 0. It follows that P(r) is
increasing for r > 0. However, P(E) = (c−E)(E −F)E > 0 and since
in our case, by (1), r > E, it follows that in the range of relevant r,
the value of P is positive, that shows that ˜ le > 0. The same argument
is used to prove that ˜ lf is positive as well.
To conclude the proof, observe that since equilibrium tuition fees are
positive, equations (9a) and (9b) imply that both values, ˜ le and ˜ lf are
strictly smaller than one. QED.





























which is positive by (1).
Proof of (c).











F(2cE − EF − c2)
(c2 − EF)
2 ,
respectively. Consider ﬁrst the case where F < E. The ﬁrst derivative
is always negative, as the second-order polynomial 2cE − EF − c2 has
no real root. However, the second is positive for all values of c ∈  
E −
√




and negative elsewhere. Since, by
(1), c > E, it follows that the above derivative is positive for c ∈ (E,ˆ c),
equal to 0 when c = ˆ c and negative for all c > ˆ c, where ˆ c = E + √
E2 − EF.











Lemma 3 The sign of the denominator of ˆ le − ˆ lf is negative.
Proof. Under assumption (1), EF −r2 is negative. Accordingly, if we prove
that the sign of the expression 4c2r2−c2EF −r2EF −6crEF +4E2F 2
is positive, the proof of the lemma is complete. This expression rewrites
as 4c2r2 + EF(4EF − 4cr − 2cr − c2 − r2). Again by assumption (1),
the sign of the expression in the parenthesis is negative. Accordingly,
22if we take the highest admissible value for the product EF, namely,
EF = r2, and show that the expression is positive for this value, the
same sign should hold for any smaller admissible value of the product












which completes the proof of the lemma. QED.
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